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PANEL IV: FEDERALISM
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN TWO DIMENSIONS:
CHARTING AREA AND INTENSITY IN THE
DECISIONS OF JUSTICE STEVENS
Allison Marston Danner* and Adam Marcus Samaha**
INTRODUCTION
This Article is about the federal judiciary and its interaction with other
government institutions. It examines two of many possible dimensions of
judicial oversight: the total area in which courts might substitute their
judgment for that of other officials, and the average intensity of judicial
review within that area. But the inspiration for these options, and the
subject of this Symposium, is Justice John Paul Stevens. So it seems
appropriate to highlight the personal before the systematic.
(1) Justice Stevens is no enemy of Great Britain. He is, for example,
obviously fond of British literature.' But there is an English maxim that he
has repeatedly condemned: "[T]he King can do no wrong."'2 His reaction
to the slogan is nothing short of allergic,3 and he looks skeptically on any
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Law clerk for Justice John Paul
Stevens, October Term 1998.
** Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Law clerk for Justice
John Paul Stevens, October Term 1998. We thank Dan Farber, John Goldberg, Robert
Schapiro, David Strauss, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for suggestions. Phillip
Riblett provided valuable research assistance.
1. See John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1373, 1373 (1992).
2. William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries *254. There is debate over the meaning of
Blackstone's description. See John C. P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:
Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. (forthcoming
2005), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=789784; see also
Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L.
Rev. 1, 3-4 (1963). One can read Blackstone to mean that the king had no authority to do
wrong, rather than to assert that the king as sovereign conceptually could not, or as a matter
of description did not, engage in wrongdoing. Justice Stevens is not reacting to the first
reading.
3. See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 697 n.24 (1997) (acknowledging that the
President was not arguing from this maxim, then nevertheless adding "the common-law
fiction that '[t]he king ... is not only incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong,'
was rejected at the birth of the Republic" (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted)); Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 95 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Nevada v. Hall, 440
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claim of governmental immunity derived from it. In his view, government
should act as agent, not principal, of the people. Public officials can, and
sometimes will, violate the law by which they are bound. In such cases,
individual citizens should have much the same right to file claims against
the government as they would against a private party who committed a
similar wrong. For Justice Stevens, law and courts protect individual
liberty by providing a forum for the redress of grievances.
(2) Before his appointment to the federal bench, Stevens served as lead
counsel to a special commission investigating allegations of corruption at
the Illinois Supreme Court. After laborious inquiries, the commission's
work ended with a recommendation that two justices of the court resign.
They did.4 To those familiar with the State's reputation, there is nothing
shocking about the identification of corruption in Illinois. But there is
something important about the way this instance of official wrongdoing was
uprooted: An eccentric gadfly, who was otherwise invisible to the political
establishment, pleaded and pushed for his complaints to be heard.5 The
lesson is that, once in a while, the conspiracy theorist is correct.
(3) Stevens clerked for Justice Wiley Rutledge, and there are some
common themes in the opinions of both Justices. 6 Working on the U.S.
Supreme Court during and as the result of a massive shift in political power,
Rutledge nevertheless refused to defer reflexively to executive claims of
exigency. His dissent in In re Yamashita,7 in which the majority upheld the
trial by military commission of a Japanese general in the waning days of
World War II, stresses individual dignity and judicial process. Rutledge
wrote, "It is not too early, it is never too early, for the nation steadfastly to
follow its great constitutional traditions, none older or more universally
protective against unbridled power than due process of law in the trial and
punishment of men." 8 The message is that government power, although
often better left in the hands of nonjudicial officials, 9 must not be
"unbridled," and federal courts have an obligation to make sure that it is
U.S. 410, 415 & n.8 (1979) (quoting the Declaration of Independence); John Paul Stevens, Is
Justice Irrelevant?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1121, 1124-26 (1993).
4. See generally Kenneth A. Manaster, Illinois Justice: The Scandal of 1969 and the
Rise of John Paul Stevens 229, 239 (2001).
5. See id. at 3-10 (noting Sherman Skolnick's poor but extensive litigation track
record).
6. For a recent example, see Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), discussed infra in Part
II.A.1.
7. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
8. Id. at 41-42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); see also John M. Ferren, Salt of the Earth,
Conscience of the Court: The Story of Justice Wiley Rutledge 315 (2004) (asserting that
Rutledge's highest value was "the worth-the dignity-of the individual").
9. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 468 (1944) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
("There are limits to the judicial power. Congress may impose others. And in some matters
Congress or the President has final say under the Constitution. But whenever the judicial
power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law ....").
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not. For Justice Stevens, like Justice Rutledge, the federal judiciary is
uniquely qualified to do so. 10
These sorts of propositions-that officials should be accountable to law,
that improbable citizen complaints should not be ignored, that courts should
promote interests in dignity and fair process-are primary themes in Justice
Stevens's work. No one on the Court is more reluctant to forfeit the
possibility of meaningful judicial review on the merits. And few Justices
remain as dedicated to case-specific inquiries and careful review of the
factual record. But Justice Stevens is not dogmatically committed to
unrestrained second-guessing of other officials. Nor is he unconcerned with
the burdens associated with wide-ranging judicial oversight. The larger
picture suggests a judge making practical choices that may entail regrettable
sacrifices. Those choices push the federal courts toward a large area of
oversight coupled with a moderated intensity of judicial review.
Our objective is to explore this combination-a system authorizing the
federal judiciary to peer into almost every comer of government, yet
discouraging federal judges from prescribing every norm, procedure, and
remedy. We do not present an all-told account of Justice Stevens's
jurisprudence, even in the field of public law. Instead, we identify themes
within his work that are telling about him and suggestive for us.
The analysis is divided into three parts. The first part charts two
dimensions of judicial oversight-area and intensity. For some, it will
seem natural for the values on both dimensions to move in the same
direction. No logic dictates that phenomenon, however, and we believe that
Justice Stevens provides an illustration of a contrary view. The second part
identifies specific examples in his decisions. As to area, we discuss his
maximalist position on the territorial jurisdiction of federal courts and his
extraordinary skepticism of governmental immunities. As to intensity, we
select four examples where his vision of intervention is not necessarily
assertive. These are Chevron deference to federal agencies,"I a soft public
use requirement in takings cases, 12 acceptance of less than fully
compensatory constitutional remedies, 13 and fondness for standards in free
speech and equal protection cases. 14 The third part briefly assesses the
implications of a large-area/low-intensity system of judicial oversight. We
point out the most plausible justifications for this combination, without
ignoring important downsides. We close by identifying certain assumptions
on which this system must depend.
10. See John Paul Stevens, The Third Branch of Liberty, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 277, 291-
92 (1986) ("If there is to be an impartial arbitrator in controversies between the individual
and the sovereign, the members of the Third Branch are surely the best qualified to accept
that responsibility."); see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 337 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that due process "bars certain arbitrary government actions").
11. See infra Part III.B. 1.
12. See infra Part III.B.2.
13. See infra Part II1.B.3.
14. See infra Part III.B.4.
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I. Two DIMENSIONS OF JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Courts face many choices about whether and how to intervene in the
affairs of other institutions. These decision points travel under a number of
doctrinal labels, including justiciability, jurisdiction, immunities, standards
of review, remedies, and so on. Aggregated across cases, the selection
made by a judicial system can be charted on several dimensions. We focus
on two:
• The area ofjudicial oversight-meaning the extent to which courts
are willing to monitor the conduct of other government officials, compared
to the instances in which no judicial oversight is available.
* The intensity ofjudicial review-meaning the extent to which courts,
when willing to monitor the conduct of other officials at all, are free to
independently scrutinize the substance of those decisions and to substitute




















One way to understand the difference between "area" and "intensity" is
to compare the distinction between "jurisdiction" and "merits." In ordinary
civil litigation, a plaintiff complains about a defendant's past, present, or
future action or inaction, and asks for judgment on the merits of that
complaint. But jurisdictional problems, whether subject matter or personal,
may prevent the judiciary from evaluating anything close to the plaintiffs
core allegations. Our notion of area is a little like the jurisdiction of the
federal courts: It measures the overall scope of claims, officials, and
conduct within the sights of the federal judiciary. Intensity, in contrast,
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remedy falling within the area of oversight. It is about how courts deal with
the merits of a complaint. 15 These categories are not exhaustive. Other
dimensions can be usefully charted, such as the theoretical ambition, the
doctrinal territory covered, or the stare decisis strength of the average
decision. 16 And we are not speaking to oversight of nongovernment
conduct. But area and intensity will illuminate something systematic about
Justice Stevens's jurisprudence, and it points out choices for the rest of the
judiciary.
Before moving to concrete examples, we should discuss a few
complications. Our two dimensions are meaningfully related. "Area"
choices are gateways to "intensity" choices. If a controversy falls outside
the chosen area of judicial oversight, there is no issue about the character of
judicial review thereafter. Indeed, if we set the system-wide area value to
zero, the intensity number is never relevant. In this sense, area is logically
prior to intensity. In addition, government victories after merits-based
judicial review can, as a functional matter, punch holes in the area of
judicial oversight by restricting the availability of legal recourse in future
cases. This effect is most serious when courts are in the habit of issuing
broad pronouncements on substantive law, and when the force of stare
decisis is powerful. But none of this is sufficient to eliminate the
area/intensity distinction. In our world, and perhaps especially with regard
to constitutional law, respect for precedent is often a moderated policy,
17
and even Supreme Court opinions can be drafted to have little effect beyond
the instant case. 18
Of potentially greater significance, the values on our axes might be
positively correlated. Less-intense forms of judicial review might naturally
accompany a small-area judiciary. This would make judges more like
"servile agents" than independent operators, locating them near point 1 on
our chart. Similarly, a large-area judiciary might come with assertive court
oversight, placing judges closer to the "aggressive principals" situated
beyond point 2. In fact, many prominent justices can be plotted near points
1 and 2. Justices William Brennan and William 0. Douglas were reluctant
15. Accordingly, qualified immunity from damages fits better on the intensity axis, even
though "immunity" is usually a matter of area. Under the standard test for qualified
immunity, courts compare official conduct with substantive law, albeit using a forgiving
standard. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 603 (2004) (asking whether an official
violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known).
16. See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme
Court 17, 21 tbls.l.1, 1.2 (1999) (using categories of narrow/wide, shallow/deep,
minimal/nonminimal, and strong stare decisis/weak stare decisis); Frederick Schauer, Justice
Stevens and the Size of Constitutional Decisions, 27 Rutgers L.J. 543, 543 (1996).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003); Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989) (distinguishing statutory precedent). Individual
justices might ignore Court precedent yet stick to their own prior conclusions. If so, it would
be more important for us that Court decisions be drafted narrowly, and subsequently read
that way.
18. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam).
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to sacrifice federal judicial jurisdiction, while their exercise of
constitutional judicial review was relatively independent and assertive.
Justices Felix Frankfurter and the second Justice Harlan often ended up
toward the other end of both axes. Even worse for our chosen dimensions,
perhaps any correlation is more than coincidental. The normative
arguments that drive choices on area might work equally well for intensity.
Imagining this connection is not difficult. Trust in the judiciary's relative
detachment from ordinary politics fits comfortably with minimal concern
about court competence-and both propositions might justify a relatively
broad judicial purview (large area) coupled with probing judicial inquiry
and independent judgment on substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
(high intensity). If the judicial system's scores on the area and intensity
axes are empirically and normatively correlated, then our two dimensions
start to collapse into one another.19
Yet area and intensity are distinct in important ways. Judges are not
compelled by any unbendable law of nature to place themselves on the
slope running from the northwest to the southeast comer on our chart. And
the other options are more intriguing. Courts might intervene rarely but
then aggressively, or often but with deference. In other words, a judiciary
might focus its field of oversight to a small territory, in which its scrutiny is
assisted by the brightest klieg lights and exercised with highly independent
judgment (i.e., point 3 and beyond).20 Or it might push the boundaries of
its attention to the furthest reaches of government operations, while
dimming its searchlights and looking only for obvious improprieties (i.e.,
point 4 and further). Each combination is associated with certain trade-offs.
It might be perfectly pragmatic, if not theoretically elegant, to move the
federal judiciary toward points 3 or 4. Courts have limited resources;
perhaps both area and intensity require resource expenditures, and one may
be appropriately exchanged for the other.21  This trade can be
accomplished, moreover, without shoving judges into the outer reaches of
judicial behavior exemplified by the "quixotic taskmaster" or "backseat
driver." Judicial intervention need not be irrationally rare while
unmercifully harsh, or constantly pestering while largely ineffectual.
In the next section, we explain ways in which Justice Stevens departs
from the intuitive slope. Admittedly, his opinions provide
counterexamples, many or all of which reflect overriding normative
commitments. For instance, Justice Stevens prefers a relatively large
federal habeas jurisdiction along with relatively independent review on the
19. Note also that judicial decision making takes place even "when" a matter is outside
the area of oversight. Somebody has to delineate the area and decide which matters fall
within and outside it. Even if judges want someone else to tell them the answer to these
"who decides" questions, the very decision to defer involves judicial judgment. Cf Louis
Michael Seidman, The Secret Life of the Political Question Doctrine, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev.
441, 444-65 (2004) (dissecting versions of the political question doctrine).
20. Justices Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia might fall closest to point 3.
21. Judicial resource constraints are stressed in Neil K. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives:
Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 245-54 (1994).
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merits, which allows federal judges to enforce strong norms of disclosure
against local prosecutors.22 Justice Stevens's type is no more pure than
anyone else's. Yet the trend in his opinions helps us to think more clearly
about the judiciary and its relation to other institutions.
II. JUSTICE STEVENS LEAVES THE SLOPE
A. The Area of Judicial Oversight
No justice is more committed than Stevens to maintaining a large area for
judicial oversight. Sometimes the area he defends is physical territory, as
with habeas jurisdiction over detainees at Camp Delta on Guantdinamo Bay.
On other occasions the "area" at issue is figurative, as with various forms of
governmental immunity. Either way, there is a theme: Some type of
judicial oversight is usually indispensable because people given
government power are capable of wrongdoing and, in Justice Stevens's
view, the risk of serious official misconduct should be minimized by the
availability of a vigilant judiciary.
1. Jurisdictional Territory
The best example of the Stevens position is recent. In response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress authorized the President
to use "all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or
aided the terrorist attacks... or harbored such organizations or persons." 23
After its military attack on Al Qaeda and the organization's supporters in
Afghanistan, the United States decided to house hundreds of foreign
detainees at the U.S. naval station at Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba.
At the time, it was not at all clear that federal courts would exercise
jurisdiction if habeas applications were filed on behalf of these noncitizens.
In the 1950 case of Johnson v. Eisentrager,24 the Court denied habeas to a
group of German citizens who had been captured, tried by military
22. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (discussed infra Part II.A. 1.); Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 389-90 (2000) (Stevens, J.) (regarding the standard of review on the
merits for habeas claims of state prisoners); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 714
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing nondisclosure and materiality). For other leading
counterexamples, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (concluding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act violated the
Establishment Clause); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 540-42 (1993) (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J.) (searching municipal legislative
history for evidence of improper purpose); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(indicating opposition to free-exercise exemptions from generally applicable regulations));
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 748 & n.27, 749 (1982) (joining the majority opinion).
23. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, §§ 1-2, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
24. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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commission for war crimes, and incarcerated abroad.25 In Rasul v. Bush,26
the government accordingly contended that Article III courts had no
business on Guantdnamo, and the lower courts had dismissed the habeas
applications at issue.27 Detention of noncitizens on (technically) foreign
territory as part of a congressionally authorized military campaign against
an ongoing terrorist threat was, at least arguably, a matter of executive
discretion and beyond federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court saw it differently. Without adjudicating the claims
for relief, Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court, refused to
relinquish habeas jurisdiction.28 Stevens disposed rather summarily of the
Eisentrager precedent and instead stressed the little-known case of Ahrens
v. Clark.29 Decided in 1948 over the dissent of Justice Rutledge, Ahrens
held that the District Court for the District of Columbia lacked jurisdiction
over the habeas petitions of German citizens detained at Ellis Island,
because the petitioners did not reside within the district court's territorial
jurisdiction. 30 Between 1948 and the 2004 decision in Rasul, however, the
Court relaxed the strict territorial rule announced in Ahrens. Justice
Stevens used that movement to undercut both Ahrens and Eisentrager. He
reasoned that the latter was concerned only with a constitutional right to
habeas access, partly because Ahrens led judges to assume no statutory
grant of habeas jurisdiction in those circumstances. 31 But Justice Stevens
considered the Ahrens premise cracked, which helped him escape the
holding in Eisentrager.32
The effort expended by Justice Stevens to distinguish precedent indicates
a preference for maximum habeas jurisdiction, and the logic suggests a
tribute by Stevens to his former boss. In 1956, Stevens published an essay
on Justice Rutledge which opened with an analysis of the Ahrens dissent.33
Stevens quoted a passage questioning the government's freedom to escape
the reach of judicial review through strategic decision making.
[M]ay the jailers stand in defiance of federal judicial power, and plead
either the accident of the locus of detention outside the court's territorial
limitations, or their own astuteness in so selecting the place, to nullify
judicial competence? 34
25. See id. at 777-81.
26. 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
27. See id. at 472-73.
28. See id. at 480.
29. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
30. See id. at 192-93.
31. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 477.
32. He did not reach the question whether the constitutional rule announced in
Eisentrager was still good law. See id. at 479.
33. See John Paul Stevens, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in Mr. Justice 319, 319 (Allison
Dunham & Philip B. Kurland eds., 1956). Stevens clerked for Rutledge during October
Term 1947. See Robert Judd Sickels, John Paul Stevens and the Constitution: The Search
for Balance 1 (1988).
34. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 195 (Rutledge, J., dissenting), quoted in Stevens, supra note 33,
at 321.
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Although Rutledge lost battles in Ahrens and Yamashita, fifty years later his
former clerk used Rutledge's arguments to maximize the reach of federal
habeas jurisdiction.
Rasul's importance is easy to overstate. Beyond a cryptic footnote,35 the
majority said nothing of substance about the merits of the detainee claims.
Nor is it certain that any detainee will ever receive habeas relief. In this
vein, consider Justice Stevens's earlier opinion for the Court in Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council.36  That decision rejected challenges to an
executive policy of turning back Haitian boats that were illegally
transporting passengers to the U.S., without first determining whether the
passengers qualified as refugees. 37  Justice Stevens held the policy
permissible under federal statute and international treaty.38 "'Although the
human crisis is compelling," he concluded, "'there is no solution to be
found in a judicial remedy. " 39 Sale underscores our conviction that Justice
Stevens's dedication to area is not a precommitment on the intensity of
judicial review. 40 Relief was withheld on the merits, but the Haitians got a
full hearing on the legality of executive policy.
Equally important, however, a commitment to reach the merits can have
ex ante effects. Practical consequences might follow the simple assertion of
habeas jurisdiction, at least if there is any credible threat of judicial
condemnation. Indeed, there are indications that the opportunity for merits-
based review on habeas has affected executive branch decisions. The
Department of Defense announced an annual administrative review process
for Guantdnamo detainees shortly before the Supreme Court handed down
Rasul, and it formed Combatant Status Review Tribunals shortly
afterward.4 1 Military officials have started charging and trying a few
detainees before military commissions for offenses under the laws of war.42
35. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 n.15.
36. 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
37. The United States had detained the intercepted Haitians at Guantd.namo Bay, until
those facilities became overcrowded. See id. at 163.
38. See id. at 159, 188 (relying on the extraterritoriality canon as applied to provisions
involving foreign and military affairs); see also 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252 (2005); United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 10 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S.
267.
39. See Sale, 509 U.S. at 188 (quoting Haitian Refugee Cent. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794,
841 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
40. Cf Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers Council,
35 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 2 (1994) (arguing that the case "continued the Rehnquist Court's
disturbing pattern of reflexive deference to presidential power in foreign affairs").
41. See Paul Wolfowitz, Dep't of Def., Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy
Combatants in the Custody of the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
Cuba (2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2004/d20040518gtmoreview.pdf; Memorandum from
Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, on Order Establishing Combatant Status
Review Tribunals, to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
42. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (rejecting challenges to
these tribunals), cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3287 (U.S. Nov. 7,2005) (No. 05b-184).
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And some detainees recently have been released to other countries. 43 In
late November 2005, moreover, the government lodged criminal charges in
federal court against Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen who had been captured in
the U.S. but held in military custody as an "enemy combatant." The shift
occurred shortly before the deadline for responding to Padilla's petition for
certiorari on his habeas application. 44  One can disagree with the
government's course of action in these instances, or the Court's decision in
Rasul, without disagreeing that judicial oversight affects official behavior.
2. Governmental Immunities
Justice Stevens's reluctance to limit the area of judicial review evidenced
in Rasul is echoed in a series of opinions that he has written addressing
various governmental claims to immunity. In these cases, Justice Stevens
often rebuffs claims that federal courts do not have any authority to
consider the merits of complaints lodged by private parties.
a. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Justice Stevens's most important opinion on the subject of foreign
sovereign immunity is Austria v. Altmann.45 The case involved a dispute
over the legal status of six Gustav Klimt paintings owned by an Austrian
Jewish family in the 1930s and currently in the possession of the Austrian
National Gallery. The plaintiff in the case, Maria Altmann, alleged that the
paintings had been wrongfully and secretly appropriated from the family in
the 1940s. Altmann, however, did not learn of the facts surrounding the
unlawful seizure of the artwork until 1998. Then living in Los Angeles,
Altmann filed suit against Austria and its national museum in California
state court. The question faced by the Supreme Court was whether the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") 46 permitted a suit
based on wrongdoing that occurred in 1948.
For much of their history, U.S. courts deferred absolutely to executive
branch decisions on whether foreign sovereigns should receive immunity in
our courts.4 7 Until 1952 (the period in which the wrongdoing alleged in
Altmann occurred), the Executive Branch routinely granted requests from
foreign sovereigns for immunity in U.S. courts. From 1952 to 1976, the
Executive decided on a case-by-case basis whether to "suggest" that
immunity be granted, and its suggestions would determine whether the suit
would be dismissed by the court on that basis. In 1976, Congress enacted
43. See Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678 (D.S.C. 2005), rev'd, 423 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2005),petition for cert.filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Oct. 25, 2005) (No. 05-533); Josh
White, 3 Guantanamo Detainees Freed, Wash. Post, July 21, 2005, at A2.
44. See Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, US. Charges Detainee in Terrorism Case, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 23, 2005, at Al.
45. 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000).
47. See Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696.
2060 [Vol. 74
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN TWO DIMENSIONS
the FSIA, in part to relieve diplomatic pressure on the State Department.
The statute provided standards that would govern the immunity inquiry and
be applied by the judiciary. In Altmann, the Executive feared the flood of
litigation and diplomatic controversy that might result if the FSIA were
applied retroactively and asked the Court to find the statute inapplicable to
Altmann's case.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court. He rejected the position
advanced by the Executive and concluded that the FSIA does apply to pre-
1976 conduct. In order to reach this holding, Justice Stevens first had to
overcome the presumption announced in Landgraf v. USI Film Products-
an opinion he authored-that statutes do not operate retroactively. 48
Stevens found that the test set out in Landgraf although "seemingly
comprehensive," did not provide a "clear answer" to the FSIA.49 Drawing
on the international legal roots of foreign sovereign immunity, Stevens
acknowledged that "[t]hroughout history, courts have resolved questions of
foreign sovereign immunity by deferring to the decisions of the political
branches... on whether to take jurisdiction." 50 His reference to multiple
"political branches" provided a clue that Stevens would not find it
necessary to defer to the executive's position in the case. Stevens reasoned
that the language of the FSIA itself, and not the brief filed by the President
in Altmann, constituted the "most recent such decision" from one of the
political branches. 51  He rebuffed the suggestion that the executive's
position should be privileged:
The issue now before us, to which the Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae is addressed, concerns interpretation of the FSIA's reach-a pure
question of statutory construction... well within the province of the
Judiciary. While the United States' views on such an issue are of
considerable interest to the Court, they merit no special deference. 52
Although applying the FSIA to pre-1976 conduct has potentially sweeping
ramifications, Stevens characterized the holding as narrow.53 In particular,
he noted that the executive's view in individual cases was relevant to
judicial determinations. 54
Altmann evokes several classic themes of Justice Stevens's writings on
immunity. Most notably, he determined that the sovereign did not have
immunity, which required him both to find his own opinion in Landgraf
"unclear" and to reject the views of the executive on a question with a close
bearing on foreign affairs. As Justice Anthony Kennedy observed in
dissent, the decision to apply the FSIA may lead to the very problems the
48. See Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
49. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 677.
50. Id. at 696 (internal quotation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 701 (internal quotation omitted). Contrast Justice Stevens's support for
Chevron deference in other situations, discussed infra Part II.B. 1,
53. SeeAltmann, 541 U.S. at 701.
54. See id.
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Act was designed to remedy-pressure by foreign states on the executive to
make "suggestions" of immunity. 55 What the Altmann decision opened up,
however, was the possibility that Maria Altmann and other similarly
situated plaintiffs would have the merits of their claims adjudicated. And
although Altmann won her case in the Supreme Court, Stevens's opinion
suggested that she might not ultimately prevail on her claim.56
Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of case-by-case determinations
by the executive and judiciary about whether the foreign policy
implications of a suit should ultimately outweigh the plaintiffs claim for
relief. Justice Stevens's opinion indicated a general confidence in the
judiciary to resolve the application of sovereign immunity in future cases,
despite the political consequences such suits may have.
b. Federal Sovereign Immunity
Justice Stevens has been equally unwilling to condone sovereign
immunity in suits against the United States. In Smith v. United States,57 for
example, Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter from the majority's
decision that the waiver of immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act did not
apply to the sovereignless region of Antarctica. He chided the majority that
"[m]ajestic legislation like the Federal Tort Claims Act should be read with
the vision of the judge, enlightened by an interest in justice, not through the
opaque green eyeshade of the cloistered bookkeeper. '58 Stevens declared
that "the international community includes sovereignless places but no
places where there is no rule of law."'59 For his final salvo in Smith, Stevens
quoted Lincoln's first State of the Union message: "It is as much the duty
of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens,
as it is to administer the same between private individuals." 60
Justice Stevens also dissented from the majority's finding of
governmental immunity in United States v. Nordic Village.61  Nordic
Village was an Ohio business that entered Chapter 11. Its creditors
subsequently sought to recover from the United States money unlawfully
taken from the company's corporate account by one of the company's
officers and paid to the IRS to fulfill his individual tax liability. 62 The
question faced by the Supreme Court was whether the relevant provision of
the Bankruptcy Code63 waived the United States' immunity from suit for
money damages. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for seven members of the
Court, found that it did not. Scalia asserted that waivers of governmental
55. Id. at 733-34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. See id. at 701-02 (majority opinion).
57. 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
58. Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 216-217.
60. Id.
61. 503 U.S. 30 (1992).
62. See id. at 30-31.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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immunity must be "unequivocally expressed" 64 and described the statutory
language as ambiguous.65 Justice Stevens responded with a broadside
against sovereign immunity, calling it a "persistent threat to the impartial
administration of justice." 66 He declared that "[t]he injustice that the Court
condones today demonstrates that it is time to reexamine the wisdom of the
judge-made rules that drive its decision. '67 In Stevens's view, the Court
had committed a double indignity against justice, both by adhering to a
judicially created rule that gave the sovereign special status to defeat claims
of wrongdoing and by requiring a clear statement if the government chose
not to avail itself of that privilege.68
One other Stevens dissent is worth noting. In 1986, the Court considered
whether the text of the 1928 Flood Control Act precluded tort recovery
against the federal government. The case, United States v. James,69
involved two sets of plaintiffs who had drowned while boating on reservoirs
created pursuant to flood control projects. In both accidents, the
government was found to be negligent. The majority held that the Flood
Control Act's preservation of federal sovereign immunity for "any damage
from or by floods or flood waters" 70 included injuries both to people and to
real property. 71  Justice Stevens dissented. Relying on the legislative
history, Stevens argued that limiting the term "damage" to injuries to
property was more consistent with congressional intent.72 Stevens ended
his opinion with an unusually outraged condemnation of the Court's
conclusion.
It defies belief-and ascribes to the Members of Congress a perverse,
even barbaric, intent-to think that they spent days debating the measure
of extraconstitutional compensation they would provide riparian
landowners but intended-without a single word of dissent-to condemn
the widows, orphans, and injured victims of negligent operation of flood
control projects to an irrational exclusion from the protection of the
subsequently enacted Tort Claims Act.73
While one can imagine several reasons why Congress might have enacted
legislation that favored riparian landowners over widows and orphans, it is
not an intent that Justice Stevens would accept without clear evidence (even
perhaps a clear statement) to the contrary.
64. Nordic Viii., 503 U.S. at 33 (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 37.
66. Id. at 43.
67. Id. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 212 (1996)
(Stevens J., dissenting).
68. In an earlier opinion, Stevens had written for a unanimous Court that statutory
waivers of governmental immunity should be "liberally construe[d]." Franchise Tax Bd. of
Cal. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 517, 520 (1984).
69. 478 U.S. 597 (1986).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 702(c) (2000).
71. James, 478 U.S. at 612.
72. Id. at 619-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 620.
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c. State Sovereign Immunity
The fight over state sovereign immunity gets the attention of
commentators, but now we can see that Justice Stevens's position here is
essentially no different than for other instances of governmental
immunity. 74 He consistently resists such defenses: "[A]II Governments
should generally be accountable for their illegal conduct. '75 With regard to
U.S. states, then, his view is nearly Wilsonian. 76 Immunizing these
governments from citizen complaint and judicial redress would be, at most,
tolerated by the Federal Constitution. 77 At the same time, Justice Stevens
does not take the ultimate stance that sovereign immunity is
unconstitutional. 78 He accepts a clear-statement requirement for abrogation
of that immunity by federal statute, and he would deny Congress authority
to extend federal judicial power contrary to the dictates of the Eleventh
Amendment's text. 79 But his anti-immunity leanings are otherwise quite
obvious.
State sovereign immunity has an extensive scholarly following, so we
need only a brief restatement for our purposes. 80  The Eleventh
Amendment's plain text is, and maybe always has been, irrelevant to the
Court's sovereign immunity doctrine. The Amendment prohibits federal
courts from entertaining a suit, in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
by a citizen of State A (and some others) against State B. It is an intelligible
rule, even if it looks like bad policy. There are, of course, interpretive
ambiguities. Somewhat creative readings trim the Amendment's
boundaries so as to permit suits on federal questions, 81 and perhaps the text
should not reach Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state courts in
any case. 82 Yet the federal judicial doctrine of state sovereign immunity is
not really concerned with that snippet of text. For a long time, the doctrine
74. Accord Robert A. Schapiro, Balancing, Justice, and the Eleventh Amendment:
Justice Stevens' Theory of State Sovereign Immunity, 27 Rutgers L.J. 563, 566-67 (1996).
75. Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505,
514 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
76. James, not Woodrow. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 457 (1793)
(opinion of Wilson, J.) (denying that Georgia was "sovereign" with respect to Union
purposes); James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, in 1 The Founders'
Constitution 265 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987) (Dec. 1-11, 1787) ("[T]he
sovereignty resides in the people.").
77. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,413 (1978) (Stevens, J.).
78. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1201, 1202
(2001).
79. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92-97 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 81, 93 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
80. See Mark Tushnet, Alarnism Versus Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist
Court, 78 Ind. L.J. 47, 71 n.93 (2003).
81. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 114 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 166 (1999).
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has accomplished both less and more than even creative interpretations of
the Amendment suggest.
For example, nobody seems to care about states consenting their way into
federal court on claims filed by out-of-staters. 83 Federal courts also protect
states beyond the Amendment's plain text. The nineteenth century was not
over before the Supreme Court barred a federal suit against a state filed by a
citizen of that state. 84 In fact, the rule now reaches beyond adjudication in
federal courts. 85 There are handy routes around all of this doctrine. 86 But
the substitutes are not always perfect, and so the debate on the Court has
been whether Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity from
private suits for compensatory damages, without purchasing state consent.
A majority of the current Court, including Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
usually says no. And they support their conclusions with some founding-
era promises plus a general respect for states and their treasuries. 87
Justice Stevens's contrary view is not surprising in light of his other work
in the immunity field. It is difficult enough for him to accept statutorily
grounded or common-law derived immunities. He may abide by the idea as
a hangover from 1787, a sub-constitutional doctrine not entirely abolished
by ratification. However, the notion that an elected United States Congress
cannot abrogate this immunity by otherwise valid legislation is almost
comically inconsistent with Justice Stevens's philosophy. It
constitutionally entrenches a rule nearly opposite his view: Complaints
against governments raised by private parties should be adjudicated on the
merits as often as possible. Terminating a case based on the governmental
status of the defendant is not even close to that goal.88 Whatever dignitary
interests states have, in his view they are nothing compared to that of
private individuals who believe they have been harmed by government
wrongdoing. All the more so when a national political institution, which
may incorporate the interests and arguments of states, has endorsed such
litigation. Even though it is far from clear that the majority has
83. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 82 & n.9, 83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing to
the problem); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 516 n.8, 524-25, 543 (1978). The
Amendment says nothing about consent, and issues of Article III's scope could be
jurisdictional matters that courts must address sua sponte.
84. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
85. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
86. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908).
87. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760 ("The preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their status as
sovereign entities."); The Federalist No. 84, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (focusing on debt-collection claims).
88. Accord Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 466 (1793) (Wilson, J.) ("Causes
and not parties to causes, are weighed by justice, in her equal scales: On the former solely,
her attention is fixed: To the latter, she is, as she is painted, blind." (emphasis omitted)).
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accomplished anything very meaningful with its state sovereign immunity
decisions, Justice Stevens and three others continue to dissent. 8
9
d. Absolute Official Immunity
Occasionally, courts grant government officials "absolute immunity"
from lawsuits for compensatory damages. The legitimate objectives of
certain offices, the argument goes, are so important or sensitive to litigation
that courts should refrain from awarding damages to private parties.90 The
rules of absolute immunity are not as self-executing as their title suggests,
however. For instance, once the courts determine which officers are
entitled to the protection, they might demand that the alleged misconduct be
closely connected to the defendant's official duties.91 In any event, the
concept is similar to that of other immunities we have reviewed.
Justice Stevens occasionally supports absolute immunity. He is willing
to protect not only judges, 92 but also the President under certain conditions.
Thus he joined the majority in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,93 granting a former
President immunity from civil damages claims premised on his official
conduct while in office. 94 But Justice Stevens is much better known for
rejecting a more recent claim of presidential immunity, and his position in
that case fits easily into his general anti-immunity views.
The judgment in Clinton v. Jones95 was unanimous, but Justice Stevens
wrote the opinion of the Court and has shouldered some of the subsequent
criticism. The case was a marquee dispute, so we offer only a brief recap.
Paula Jones alleged that President Clinton sexually propositioned her while
he was governor of Arkansas and she was a state employee. But Clinton
was President by the time her lawsuit was filed, and he accordingly
demanded temporary immunity from suit. Nobody on the Court was
willing to give it to him. For eight Justices, Stevens declared that the Court
89. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 92-97 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analogizing congressional regulation of the private
sector and referring states to political safeguards). But cf Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004) (denying immunity); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004)
(same); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (same). This
disinclination to support status-based immunity claims helps account for his position on
tribal immunity. See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of
Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 514 (1991) (Stevens, J., concurring).
90. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693 (1997).
91. See, e.g., Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) (Stevens, J.) (involving
prosecutorial immunity); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993) (Stevens, J.)
(same).
92. See Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993) (denying such
protection to a court reporter); cf Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 14 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (opposing immunity for a judge who had a tardy lawyer dragged into court by
marshals. and observing that "[olrdering a battery has no relation to a function normally
performed by a judge").
93. 457 U.S. 731, 733 (1982).
94. See id at 748 & n.27, 749 (reserving the question whether Congress may abrogate
this immunity).
95. 520 U.S. at 681.
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had "never suggested that the President, or any other official, has an
immunity that extends beyond the scope of any action taken in an official
capacity. '96 Although the stakes of the case were much higher than those
in his other immunity decisions, its outcome merely confirms Justice
Stevens's reluctance to place any claims of governmental wrongdoing
beyond the reach of judicial process.
Clinton also follows a theme expressed in Altmann and Rasul. As with
all claims for official immunity, probably the best arguments are structural
and functional, not formal or historical. As defendant, President Clinton
stressed the unique demands of his office within the constitutional design. 97
The President is singular and special. It would not have been surprising had
the federal judiciary at least postponed consideration of Jones's suit and the
attendant burdens of modem litigation. Justice Stevens's response, aside
from precedent, 98 rested on faith in federal judges. He reasoned that a
conscientious district judge could avoid serious interference with execution
of the President's duties-without forfeiting the ability of a private party to
receive immediate and ongoing attention from the judiciary.99
In retrospect and looking only at this controversy, the Court's optimism
might have been misplaced.100 We are more interested in what the decision
represents: a willingness to trust an individual judicial officer to fairly and
efficiently manage an inquiry into the conduct of our highest government
officers. It is perfectly consistent with Justice Stevens's dedication to the
widest feasible area of oversight for official misconduct.
B. The Intensity of Judicial Review
However large the area of judicial oversight, its intensity need not
increase accordingly. For Justice Stevens at least, the two variables are not
entirely dependent. What follows is a short collection of relatively
restrained instances of judicial review in public law. The first example
involves judicial review of federal agency decisions, the second arises from
takings claims, the third addresses remedies for the violation of
constitutional norms, and the fourth comes from substantive constitutional
law.
1. Chevron Deference
A leading example of low-intensity judicial review involves the
relationship between courts and federal agencies. The best known judicial
decision in administrative law, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
96. See id. at 694.
97. See id. at 697.
98. See id. at 704-05.
99. See id. at 707-08 (holding that the District Court had abused its discretion in
deferring trial until after the completion of the President's term of office).
100. President Clinton must bear some responsibility for his subsequent deposition
testimony, which helped prime a truly distracting impeachment proceeding.
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Defense Council, Inc.,10 1 was written by Justice Stevens in 1984. Since
then, it has been cited in more than 8000 judicial opinions. 102 One might
debate the meaning and empirical significance of the decision, and whether
it was intended to be a break from past practice or simply a focal point for
understanding a position already staked out in the federal courts. For our
purposes, these details are insignificant. What matters is the general
message of the case Justice Stevens authored, and the large number of
important executive decisions that could come within its reach.
Justice Stevens made quite clear that federal courts sometimes are
obligated to restrain their independent judgment, even on questions of
statutory interpretation, in the face of reasonable judgments by federal
administrative agencies. "When a court reviews an agency's construction
of the statute which it administers," he wrote, the judiciary first looks for
unambiguous congressional intent.103 But when there is none,
the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute ....
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.104
The justification for such deference is rooted in several ideas. It comes
from practical concerns about institutional competence, a democratic
commitment to enhancing the legitimacy of policy judgments, and a
realist's acknowledgment that statutory interpretation can involve such
policy decisions. Each idea favors judicial modesty. Courts will often lack
desirable technical expertise and political accountability if they take on
public policy choices-choices that are often unavoidable in the sensible
implementation of federal statutes. 105
Chevron's step two is therefore an instance of restraint along the second
dimension of judicial oversight. True enough, courts have not fully
retreated. They are not forfeiting jurisdiction to double-check the work of
federal bureaucracies; and judges who see clarity in most statutory
provisions can often abide by Chevron and yet reject agency conclusions.
But a lighter judicial touch is directed when an agency makes debatable
choices that are not plainly inconsistent with congressional intent. Even
within the area of judicial oversight and even when dealing with the
familiar material of the United States Code, courts may defer to the
decisions of other officials.
101. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
102. This is according to a KeyCite list drawn from the Westlaw database on September
17, 2005. Although now sufficiently entrenched to be passed over, Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), had a long head start and is still at only 3000 judicial citations.
103. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
104. Id. at 843 (footnotes omitted).
105. See id. at 843 & n. 11, 844-45; see also id. at 865 ("Judges are not experts in the
field, and are not part of either political branch of the Government.").
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In recent years, the Court has produced uncertainty about the domain in
which Chevron is supposed to operate. 10 6 It is not always clear what types
of executive decisions even qualify for Chevron-style deference, and which
might receive less-respectful review. 10 7 Nor has Justice Stevens dedicated
himself to the broadest, cleanest conceivable application of Chevron
deference. There is little chance he would defer to the Department of
Justice on a question of federal criminal law, for example. But on other
questions and under other statutory schemes, like the environmental policy
choices involved in Chevron itself,10 8 he remains willing to suspend
independent judicial judgment.
2. Public-Use Takings
Chevron deference is not far removed from the Stevens approach to a
now-controversial aspect of constitutional property rights. In takings cases,
Justice Stevens is regularly deferential to political outcomes, and perhaps
especially so when compensation for property owners is assured. This
leaning was on display last Term in Kelo v. City of New London.109
Pursuant to an economic development plan, the City sought to take by
eminent domain privately owned homes and other property. Ultimately, not
all of the property in question would be occupied by the City or the general
public, however. Some of it was slotted for use by private commercial
interests. Nine unwilling sellers therefore complained that the City would
not be taking their property for any "public use," l10 as required by judicial
precedent that locates takings restrictions within the Fourteenth
Amendment. "'1
Justice Stevens, writing for a five-member majority, refused to replace
the policy judgment of the City's officials. They had concluded that the
development would benefit the municipality in general, they were willing to
pay for the property involved, and the federal judiciary was not in the best
position to assess long-term, cross-cutting, and dynamic economic impact
of the plan and the alternatives. Justice Stevens stressed that past Courts
had consistently interpreted the public use demand leniently, "reflecting our
longstanding policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field."1 12
106. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo.
L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. (forthcoming
April 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=739129;
Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 347-49
(2003).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 231-38 (2001).
108. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
109. 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
110. See id. at 2658-60.
111. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994); id. at 405-06 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
112. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663.
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Acknowledging official abuse was possible, Stevens nevertheless refused to
draft a prophylactic rule to replace case-specific review. 113
Kelo might say as much about precedent as Justice Stevens's preferences.
In large measure, the Court had already marked a path away from high-
intensity review of public use determinations' 14-whether or not the
general public was aware of it. Justice Stevens's opinion is still notable in
light of his subsequent public comments. Two months later, he indicated
his personal opinion that the City's aggressive use of its takings authority
was probably misguided.' 15 Yet he also concluded that judicial restraint,
rather than judicial regulation, was the better course: "[T]ime and time
again judges who truly believe in judicial restraint have avoided the
powerful temptation to impose their views of sound economic theory on the
policy choices of local legislators." 116  At least where private party
compensation is assured, Justice Stevens believes his role in public use
disputes is largely restricted to checking whether municipalities like New
London aim at legitimate goals and make considered decisions-not
whether they make wise ones. 117
3. Constitutional Remedies
Consider, too, Justice Stevens's approach to constitutional remedies.
This is an area in which constitutional text says little. The Federal
Constitution offers few explicit instructions on how private parties might
enforce its guarantees. Historical sources of original meaning typically say
even less. So when claimants demand judicial redress for constitutional
wrongs, the results are likely to be determined with a relatively large
measure of court judgment. That judgment could be exercised
independently, without reference to the interests and efforts of other
institutions. On certain questions-like exclusionary rules, 118 Miranda
113. See id. at 2667 ("[T]he hypothetical cases posited by petitioners can be confronted if
and when they arise.").
114. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (O'Connor, J.)
("[W]here the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable
public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public
Use Clause."); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31-32 (1954).
115. See Justice John Paul Stevens, Judicial Predilections, Address to the Clark County
Bar Association, Las Vegas, Nevada 10 (Aug. 18, 2005) (transcript on file with authors)
("[M]y own view is that the allocation of economic resources that result from the free play of
market forces is more likely to produce acceptable results in the long run than the best-
intentioned plans of public officials.").
116. Id. at 10-11.
117. Accord Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 881 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (indicating his objections to minimum wage laws as a matter of economic policy
but denying a judicial role in killing them with constitutional law), overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667 n.19,
2668.
118. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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warnings, 1 9 and damages remedies for privacy violations by federal
officials° 20 -some critics believe this is just what has happened. 121
There is another side to Supreme Court decisions in this field, however.
In a more collaborative spirit, federal courts sometimes accept
congressional or executive solutions to remedial questions. Modem cases
are especially reluctant to authorize damages remedies for constitutional
violations when another branch of government has addressed the matter. At
least when other officials have carefully designed a comprehensive system
for mediating the demands of efficient administration, deterrence, and
compensation, the courts will probably refrain from dramatic
intervention. 122
Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court in Bush v. Lucas123 is emblematic
of this approach. It represents a compromise on the. intensity of judicial
review without sacrificing much area. The plaintiff was a federal employee
who had recovered back pay through an administrative review process on a
speech-retaliation claim. He then sought additional relief from the judiciary
for uncompensated injuries, 124 and his claims were rejected in light of the
existing administrative remedy. But the simple presence of an
administrative alternative was insufficient to preclude judicial oversight.
Those remedies were checked for constitutional adequacy. 125 Although one
might quibble with the judgment in that particular case, judgment was
undeniably exercised.
One plausible understanding of these cases involves our distinction
between area and intensity. Such decisions retain court authority to police
boundaries imposed on other officials by the Constitution. Yet those
boundaries are left wide or flexible enough for those officials to exercise
considerable discretion. They understand that courts will not close their
eyes to subsequent complaints, but their judgments are accorded
meaningful respect. 126
119. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
120. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971); id. at 400, 404-06 (Harlan, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 457 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
122. See Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (refusing to require awards of
consequential damages for the improper denial of cash benefits); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 (1983) (addressing government employee claims for monetary relief beyond that
authorized in ordinary law).
123. 462 U.S. at 367.
124. See id. at 371, 372 & nn.8-9, 373 (referring to plaintiffs complaints about the
absence of a jury trial and uncompensated emotional injury, dignitary interests, and
attorneys' fees, plus the lack of punitive damages under the administrative scheme).
125. See id at 368, 378 n.14; see also Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 425 (concluding that
Congress did not fail to provide "meaningful safeguards or remedies").
126. Cf Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, 1736 (1991) (distinguishing complete
relief from "a general structure of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government
within the bounds of law").
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4. Speech and Equal Protection
No one would characterize Justice Stevens as shy about using the First
and Fourteenth Amendments against other branches and levels of
government. Overall, he is as conscientious and perhaps as assertive as
anyone else now serving on the Court. And yet there are critical spaces
where Justice Stevens strongly prefers doctrinal flexibility. Even on
questions of speech regulation and legal equality, which are so deeply
important to the Justice and the Nation, he is not willing to use one opinion
to flatly dictate outcomes in all future cases.
A nice example is his treatment of "content-based" regulation of speech.
Justice Stevens understands that the First Amendment's protection for "the
freedom of' speech cannot be both sensible and utterly content neutral. 127
The judiciary, by whatever means necessary, will permit regulation of
perjury, fraud, conspiracy to commit murder, contracts, and much other
conduct that works with words. 128 Beyond the obvious cases, Justice
Stevens often resists formulas that constrain judicial discretion in the
instant, and unforeseen, case. In his words, "the attempt to craft black-letter
or bright-line rules of First Amendment law often produces unworkable and
unsatisfactory results, especially when an exclusive focus on rules of
general application obfuscates the specific facts at issue and interests at
stake in a given case." 129
There is a parallel strain in his writings on equal protection. His
declaration in Craig v. Boren130 that the Constitution has "only one Equal
Protection Clause" was more than a truism.131 The point of his concurring
opinion was that two or three tiers of judicial scrutiny were too
confining. 132 On one hand, this suggests equal protection doctrine should
be spread out, perhaps to any group or individual disproportionately
burdened by any form of state action. Yet whatever spreading is implied by
the opinion comes with reluctance to categorically prohibit government line
drawing. Justice Stevens indicated that a loosely specified standard is
appropriate in equal protection cases, permitting courts to consider
normative and empirical arguments from all sides. 133 This suggests that
127. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[O]ur decisions demonstrate that content-based distinctions, far from being
presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent
understanding of the First Amendment.").
128. Accord Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance 18
(1990).
129. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale L.J. 1293, 1307 (1993); see
also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 780-81 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
130. 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Accord Schauer, supra note 16, at 553.
132. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451-55 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
133. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 213-14 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reviewing empirical
evidence but ultimately rejecting the State's justification for a gender distinction in its
alcohol regulation).
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many claims cannot be quickly rejected with the make-believe version of
rational basis review. Judicial review would have to stay meaningful. But
equally rigid upper tiers of judicial scrutiny would fall as well. Maybe
consciously, Justice Stevens's approach would authorize officials to make
novel arguments to support difficult decisions on complicated problems.
There is more to the story, of course. It is not as if the only normative
commitment in play is a preference for flexible standards-along with the
uncertainty and cost shifting to future adjudicators that tends to accompany
them. In First Amendment cases, Justice Stevens is comfortable developing
a rough hierarchy of speech value, at least to evaluate softer forms of
regulation. Political speech or speech on matters of "public concern" sits at
the top; sexually explicit communication ranks further down the scale.' 34
And no government attorney can like her chances defending regulation that
uses public ignorance as the instrument of otherwise legitimate policy
goals. 135 In equal protection cases, moreover, normative commitments are
needed to test whether "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that
the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends
the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." 136 Justice Stevens,
for his part, is profoundly concerned with state action that perpetuates caste
status and subordination, but he is more willing to permit race-conscious
state action that pushes in the opposite direction. 137 His unwillingness to
subscribe to a strong color-blindness norm is not simply a fondness for
flexible judicial standards over flat rules. It is also an aversion to rules with
a particular content.
The qualifications should not overrun the general lesson, though.
Despite his preference for a large area of judicial oversight, and even with
respect to crucial constitutional values, Justice Stevens is willing to leave
constitutional argument relatively open. More private claims get a judicial
hearing but court consideration will not guarantee government losses.
III. ON LARGE AREAS AND Low INTENSITIES
Justice Stevens is not located at any of the extreme comers on our chart.
He does not endorse federal judicial oversight for every place, person, and
conduct that might evince wrongful government action or inaction. Nor is
he systematically deferential to official justifications. Sometimes the
134. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-48 (1978) (plurality opinion of
Stevens, J.); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70-71 (1976) (plurality opinion
of Stevens, J.).
135. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502-03 (1996) (opinion of
Stevens, J.).
136. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] single standard that purports to equate remedial preferences with invidious
discrimination cannot be defended in the name of 'equal protection."'). On Justice Stevens's
arguably evolving approach to affirmative action programs, see Daniel A. Farber's
contribution to this Symposium, Backward-Looking Laws and Equal Protection: The Case
of Black Reparations, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 2271 (2006).
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courthouse doors should remain closed, and sometimes the government
bears an insurmountable burden of persuasion. Yet in essential respects,
Justice Stevens has worked to maximize the area of judicial oversight while
tempering the intensity of judicial review when exercised.
We are now in a better position to evaluate the trade-offs associated with
this combination. The foregoing provides an understanding of the choice
sets and some specific illustrations. The question is clearly too deep and
complicated to provide a wholly satisfying judgment in this space (and
maybe anywhere). So in these closing pages we offer a structured analysis
and provisional assessments.
A. Upsides
A principal virtue of maximizing the area of oversight is that officials are
less able to substitute one form of wrongdoing for another. When the
judiciary refuses to insulate a particular officer, or location, or class of
decision, there is no easy way to evade detection by a quick change of
standard operating procedure. The idea is familiar from the law
enforcement field. Habitually running intense police patrols through the
same neighborhoods might simply push illegal conduct into other locations.
Even if these geographic substitutes are not perfect for lawbreakers, they
might be sufficient to eliminate any crime-control effect from the targeted
patrols. And if the system of surveillance and response is dynamic in this
way, it is irrelevant whether government officials had perfect information
about the geographic distribution of law violations at the outset.
The same principle applies to courts monitoring other government
officials. Announcing, for example, that Guant~inamo Bay is an "Article
III-free zone"138 opens a tempting space for executive action. Similarly,
taking fewer categories of officials or official action off the table might
enhance the beneficial deterrent effect of (expected) judicial oversight.
Conscientious or at least conventionally rational officials should then more
often consider judicial preferences before taking action. If those legal
preferences accord with the best understanding of existing law, or are
otherwise socially desirable, so too might be the effect on official behavior.
There certainly are drawbacks to spreading oversight so broadly, and one
can always debate the substantive law and remedies that the federal
judiciary should enforce. Whatever the countervailing arguments, however,
maximizing oversight area can minimize evasive substitutions and boost
deterrence.
It is worth remembering the line we have tried to draw between area and
intensity. The former involves considerations that are relatively
disconnected from the merits of the claimant's allegations. They include
questions such as territorial jurisdiction, immunities affixed to the position
of a government official or the identity of an institution, along with other
138. Or, for those who equate the law with judicial judgment, a "law-free zone." Cf Brief
for Petitioners at 23, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334).
2074 [Vol. 74
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT IN TWO DIMENSIONS
litigation roadblocks that we have not detailed. 139 There are convincing
justifications for such hurdles; no sensible adjudicatory system is free of
procedure that is uncongenial to some litigants. Moreover, opponents of
government conduct do not always have clean hands, and hearing them out
racks up costs for everyone else. On the other hand, for many people the
utilitarian or moral weight of our two dimensions is not equal. Intensity is
all about the substance of private grievances against tax-paid government
officials. Area involves questions that many people regard as technicalities
or worse-whether alleged wrongdoers are insulated from judicial action by
their location, or their title, or something else relatively unresponsive to the
pleas of a private claimant. We need not take a position on these impulses
to see their influence.
The model also might be attractive to those interested in showing respect
to individuals who suffer from official misconduct. For Justice Stevens,
this seems to be a priority. Granted, his position on constitutional remedies
stops short of full compensation, at least when a complex administrative
regime is created to manage repeated claims. In addition, low-intensity
judicial review counsels against judges taking on responsibility for
wholesale system design or the administration of other institutions. The
model is more modest than that. But potential victims are receiving an
important benefit in exchange. Looking at the problem systematically, the
large area of judicial oversight promoted by Justice Stevens increases the
opportunity for individual private claimants to get a meaningful hearing in a
relatively independent Article III tribunal. In individual cases, claimants
may leave unhappy and perhaps empty-handed. Yet concentrating too hard
on such disappointment overlooks the potential for a sensible and workable
system of judicial oversight. The gadfly with an atypically serious
complaint will receive judicial attention, if not an assured victory or even
perfect compensation.
Trade-offs like these are touched on by the institutional design literature,
particularly its attention to error costs and decision costs. 140 For example,
insistence on all-things-considered standards for merits determinations
pushes off costs of decisions to lower courts and future cases. But doing so
relieves the burden of constructing a good rule with limited information.
Along with a commitment to a large territory of oversight, flexible
standards are a method for judges to learn before boxing themselves in.
This flexibility might make sense with respect to official conduct. These
actors are often relatively well-informed repeat players. They might be
difficult to deter with ordinary civil remedies, 141 but they also might have
139. These include issues of justiciability (ripeness, mootness, standing), the political
questions doctrine, federal abstention, limitations on personal jurisdiction and subject matter
jurisdiction, exhaustion of administrative remedies, limitations periods, and res judicata.
140. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke
L.J. 557, 560-61 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order
Decisions, in Behavioral Law and Economics 187 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
141. See generally Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and
the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 345 (2000).
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greater respect (or fear) for judicial disapproval. If one assumes these
officials ordinarily act in good faith, 142 but sometimes take advantage when
given the opportunity, a resource-constrained judiciary might reasonably
choose to maximize its area while moderating its review.
B. Reservations
The large-area/low-intensity model is desirable only if its compromises
make sense, and they are open to serious objection. Most important, the
model imposes several kinds of costs on many kinds of actors. For the
courts, their doors are almost always open. They are often prevented from
closing cases using shortcuts unrelated to the merits. Advocates of the
passive virtues may be concerned that the large-area model forces courts to
confront the merits of the cases too often, precluding some techniques of
judicial avoidance. 143 Nor is adjudication necessarily simplified by more
restrained forms of judicial review. Good examples are Chevron deference
and a preference for standards in constitutional law. Nonjudicial officers
might prevail more often under these approaches, but the rules of decision
require significant judicial effort nevertheless.
The commitment is more troubling when engineered by the Supreme
Court alone. That body will not always feel the consequences. Although
narrower Supreme Court decisions inhibit precedent-loving Justices from
saving time on subsequent cases, the Court's appellate jurisdiction is almost
totally discretionary. 144 Lower federal courts cannot dispose of their docket
by denying petitions for certiorari. They might respond by shirking their
court-imposed obligations, or trying to circumvent them with alternative
legal tools, like increasing opportunities for dismissal and summary
judgment. But now the large-area/low-intensity model is not really
operating.
Even if courts have the resources to reach the merits in the bulk of public
law cases, 145 we should be concerned about their competence. Deferential
142. See Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 126 S. Ct. 528, 537 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("[W]e should presume that public school officials are properly performing their
difficult responsibilities under this important statute.")
143. See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme
Court at the Bar of Politics ch. 4 (1962). This characterization assumes that precedent exerts
substantial effects on future decisions.
144. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1257 (2000). Which is hardly to say that Justice Stevens
stops short of extreme vigilance and conscientious discharge of his duties. Quite the
contrary. For just one set of examples, consider his several, solo, fact-bound dissents in
qualified immunity cases. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 125 S. Ct. 596, 603 (2004) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 620 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 234 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Ferren, supra note 8, at 345 (asserting that Justice Rutledge, who cared deeply about
individual litigants, "would not put his back [to] the record").
145. But cf. Komesar, supra note 21, at 250-51 (asserting that "only a small percentage of
governmental action receives serious judicial review"); id. at 128 (pointing out that litigation
costs and uneven distribution of stakes skew judicial ability to get at certain social
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review might provide comfort, but not every district and state court is
equipped to adjudicate the variety of challenges implied by the model.
These courts can be overseen in turn by the Supreme Court, of course. Yet
now error costs are being reduced by even greater decision costs (in the
form of appellate review). Finally, the Supreme Court itself may err, and in
more than one direction. Suppose the Court uses a strong rule of deference
to review a large area of conduct. Its deference might produce unjustified
ratification of official action, misleading casual observers into a false sense
of security and perhaps insulating political officials from full responsibility
for their decisions. 146
The burdens do not end there. Outside federal courthouses, government
officials might incorporate their predictions about judicial reaction into an
enormous number of decisions. Even so, they might still be called on to
justify themselves by dissatisfied private parties. All this inhibits decisive
executive action and freewheeling legislative choice. Such conduct comes
with its own dangers, to be sure, and deterrence generated by uncertainty is
not always bad. The central problem with the large-area/low-intensity
combination is that its attractive features do not clearly outpace its
unavoidable burdens, once all legitimate interests are accounted for.
If conventional legal logic plainly dictated this combination, it could be
justified on rule-of-law grounds. But that is unlikely. Although some
restrictions on the area of oversight are the product of judicial creativity,'147
the model itself depends on contestable legal judgments. There is no clause
in the Constitution explicitly mandating deference to political judgments
about constitutional remedies, for instance, or favoring standards over rules
in adjudication of speech clause claims.
C. Assumptions
Is the large-area/low-intensity combination better than the alternatives?
Because a satisfying assessment of the model could be buried in empirical
uncertainty, we can instead offer some assumptions on which it makes
sense.
First is a strong worry about the abuse of government authority. Perhaps
officials will regularly violate law if assured that no court will intervene-
but they will abide by judicial orders to the contrary. In this spirit, Justice
Stevens has, for instance, suggested that inroads into the doctrine of
sovereign immunity in seventeenth-century England were made to protect
problems). Komesar might underestimate the force of a small set of cases on a government
that ordinarily supports the federal judiciary as a sensible dispute resolution mechanism.
146. Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510-11 (1951) (plurality opinion of
Vinson, C.J.) (apparently performing a risk assessment for an internationally led communist
overthrow of the government), with id. at 568-70 (Jackson, J., concurring) (blanching at the
idea).
147. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-
19 (1976) (reviewing abstention decisions).
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liberty from the threat of an unfettered executive. 148 At the same time, he
surely expects other officials to heed court orders. If you assume a
pervasive risk of officials departing from their duties as faithful agents of
the public, and yet respect for the judiciary as a dispute resolution
mechanism, there might be reason to increase the area of judicial oversight.
Second, the upside of judicial oversight must be adequate to overcome
increased decision costs, the risks of judicial error, and the threat to
vigorous democratic politics. Aside from remedying the misconduct of
other officers, there could be something acute in the injury to private
interests when allegations of official wrongdoing are not taken seriously.
Maybe the refusal of any independent arbiter to seriously consider a
grievance against the state is often no less distressing than the challenged
government action. Accordingly, in Justice Stevens's opinions the dignity
of the individual vindicated by the judicial process emerges as a value
worthy of independent respect and judicial protection. On this assumption,
judicial review delivers important benefits even when it is exercised with
deference to other institutions. Moreover, such deference can ameliorate
problems of judicial incompetence and democratic insulation.
Third and related, it could be that the process of serious judicial attention
is prized by judges and citizens more generally. It is not difficult to picture
the satisfaction, on both sides of the bench, when an initially implausible
complaint is worked over and then vindicated. In any event, courts might
focus on the most serious injuries, such as deprivations of physical liberty.
And those restraints might be sufficiently unique that government officials
will have difficulty achieving the same result by other means. That would
make judicial oversight effectual and highly valued. Indeed, oversight with
deference can fit with a viable sense of federal judicial duty. These
positions are not dislocated from politics, but they are relatively insulated
from partisan pressure. Refusing to shutter their view of official conduct,
while refraining from self-indulgence, federal courts might gently push the
rest of the government away from gratuitous private harm. This
understanding of the judicial office elevates the role of the courts in taming
official misconduct, without relying on unelected judges to run the
government or misusing their authority to undercut democratic
accountability.
We now are back to where we started. The premises on which large-
area/low-intensity review makes the best sense are those so strongly
suggested by the decisions of Justice Stevens-that government officials
will misbehave if their discretion is unchained but will take seriously
judicial preferences when oversight is maintained, that even the unlikely
complainant deserves respect and some sort of hearing, and that the federal
judiciary bears special responsibility for ensuring reasoned state action,
148. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 142 n.21 (1984)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Courts did not wish to confront the King's immunity from suit
directly; nevertheless they found the threat to liberty posed by permitting the sovereign's
abuses to go unremedied to be intolerable.").
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especially when physical liberty is at stake. Each premise may be fairly
contested. But the bets Justice Stevens has made line up with the system of
oversight indicated by his judicial opinions. His decisions not only
aggregate to the model of oversight we have examined, they also suggest
the values that can justify it.
CONCLUSION
The federal judiciary's relationship with other government officials can
be constructed in many different ways. Two of the dimensions by which
that relationship is defined are the area of judicial oversight and the
intensity of judicial review within that territory. Justice Stevens helps
demonstrate that the values on these two axes need not move together.
Courts might exchange intensity for area. Doing so enhances the
judiciary's ability to vindicate the unlikely claim of an injured citizen,
without pretending to dominate other institutions. In any event, the
dimensions of area and intensity help us think more clearly about the
options. For that, and much more, we have Justice Stevens to thank.
Notes & Observations
